Column Archive: 2008

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"What's your challenge?"


December 22, 2008
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Toyota can’t exist -- Toyota can’t be Toyota -- without a challenge. That’s true for each individual or work group and for the company as a whole. Micro and macro. The first challenge the company faced was learning how to build cars. That challenge wasn’t really all that challenging. In it early days, led by Kiichiro Toyoda, Toyota successfully copied the Ford/GM model but did so no better than many others. The second challenge for the company, after surviving the war and immediate post-war period, was to chase its dream to “catch up with the Big Three”. This is the challenge that spurred Toyota, led by Eiji Toyoda, to separate itself from the field. The company’s success in this regard was already a fait accompli by the end of the 1970s, and by the mid to late 90s Toyota was the unquestionable industry leader. That’s when the malaise began to set in. That’s when some quite “non-Toyota” decisions and behavior began to manifest. Back to that later -- that gets into Toyota’s deeper challenge.

What about the immediate challenge, which is to respond to the current crisis that has befallen the entire global economy, hitting the auto industry especially hard? I have no doubt that Toyota will weather this storm and in fact come out the other end stronger than ever. That’s what’s always happened in the past. Toyota was a relative unknown amongst Japanese companies until the oil shock of 1973. When that storm passed, industry leaders and academics noticed that Toyota had somehow weathered the storm unscathed, and was curiously stronger while others were mired in red ink if not going under completely. The same thing happened a few years later when the second oil shock hit in 1979. Same thing a decade after that when endaka (the “strong yen”, when the yen to dollar exchange rate doubled in a matter of months) hit in 1988. Same thing a couple of years after that when the Japanese economic bubble burst, spiraling the country into a decade-long tail-spin. It was the same scenario in each case: the economy tanks, competitors lose money, Toyota outdistances them even further. When I joined Toyota, there still wasn’t that much separating them from Nissan. By the late 90s, Nissan was on the brink of bankruptcy while Toyota was setting record profits.

So, figure the same thing will happen this time around, too.

Toyota’s deeper crisis

But, the bigger and somewhat ironic problem for Toyota is that the need and opportunity to respond to these immediate problems will come as a welcome distraction from having to face its true, deeper, crisis. That crisis is no less profound than facing fundamental questions such as who are we? What are we here for? What is our purpose? In short, an identity crisis that will manifest itself in practical matters such as how do we develop our people, maintain our principles, and/or adapt them going forward?

So what makes me say Toyota has been in a malaise, or identity crisis?

When it became clearly evident in the mid to late 90s that the company had succeeded in attaining its goal (meeting its challenge) to “catch up with the Big Three”, there emerged the need for a new challenge. The only company that could challenge Toyota was Toyota. So it began to set new goals to challenge itself. One of those was to tackle the environmental challenge -- hence the hybrid. That challenge was a real one, and one that all auto companies still face and will face in the future.

But, the other challenge the company chose was arbitrary, and even a bit desperate. It decided to chase “big”. To grow, grow, grow. From challenging to be the best car company, it decided to be the biggest. The reason Toyota decided to be the biggest was simply because it needed the challenge. But, the challenge to be the biggest turned out to be a bigger and different kind of challenge than the company thought.

I recall in the very early 90s a fascinating argument between two Toyota production executives about the urgency of developing more talent to manage global factories according to TPS principles and practices. One executive (and I took his side in the debate) argued that we were sorely lacking and slow in developing talent, both Japanese and local, to manage Toyota’s global growing footprint of factories. The other executive argued that there wasn’t really such a need for so many globally adept managers because, after all, “we’re not going to be making new factories like rabbits…”

And so it was until ten years ago. The company still had only the three major factories the company had worked methodically to establish and place on a firm footing starting with NUMMI 25 years ago. Then, in the next ten year span, the company built two additional assembly plants, two powertrain facilities, announced another assembly plant, and contracted for capacity at another. Quality problems began to appear leading to headlines that Toyota’s reliability was no longer bullet proof. A dearth of qualified Japanese managers meant that more responsibility was given to local managers. But, a dearth of fully developed local managers meant the company had to scramble to quickly rotate and transfer its limited pool of qualified talent and hire others from the outside, even from (take a deep breath) the Detroit Three.

The interesting part of this story to me is that some decisions seemed to violate long-standing Toyota thinking. To give one example, Toyota has always stipulated flexible capacity and a specific characteristic of the company was that it would always try to build more than one product in each plant, usually more than one on each assembly line (the technical capability to produce more than one model on one line is not uniquely Toyota -- the determination to always hedge your bets is). This was one way to maintain maximize flexibility against changes in demand (we talked about other ways in column #6). If you try to capacitize a factory precisely at your predicted market size, you expose yourself to huge risks to changes in demand -- a special hazard in the auto industry where decisions to install capacity are made far in advance.

So, Toyota’s installation of capacity dedicated solely to big Tundra trucks in San Antonio was on top of capacity already in place in Indiana. What happens if there’s a downturn in demand for Tundra trucks? Well, now we know happens. Toyota had to scramble the same way Ford had to scramble when demand weakened for the Taurus when it had two factories dedicated to building Taurus. But, any capacity installation mistakes Toyota has made in recent years are, after all, just mistakes. And mistakes, or the company’s attitude towards them and ability to learn from them, distinguish Toyota from its competitors more than any other visible characteristic. (As we’ve discussed frequently in this space, all the way back to column # 1. I should note, too, that Toyota will often start a new facility with one product, then ramp up, build capability and add a second, then third product later, so we need to be careful not to magnify too much the magnitude of those particular mistakes. But, there are others.)

Toyota will recover from its recent missteps and these kinds of problems. Responding to problems, to crises, brings out the best in Toyota. In Japan, Toyota people are sometimes referred to as “problem-solving junkies”. Hah -- come to think of it, that one descriptor says much of what I was trying to say above.

But, focusing on solving immediate problems may very well distract the company from its deeper crisis. Toyota has no one to follow anymore -- the Detroit Three no longer provide a rabbit to chase. So, what is its new challenge, really? If Toyota’s mission or purpose is to survive, it will probably adapt to do so (it’ll figure out what to do with the excess capacity). But, an intense drive to improve, or “relentless pursuit of perfection” to quote the Lexus ads, requires something more tangible than that. What will drive its pursuit of decades more kaizen and kakushin (revolution)?

What will drive yours?

See you back here, first week of the New Year!

John
John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

A Lean Dream…


December 11, 2008
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…wouldn’t it be great to see some lean Practical Problem Solving brought to the Detroit 3 “bailout” debate in Washington? Asking simply: What is the problem and how do all the “solutions” that are being bandied about match up?

Forgive me for quoting from my own book, but (page 32 of Managing to Learn) “First, what is a problem? Organizations spend enormous amounts of time and energy debating, exploring, and trying solutions -- yet, how often is it clearly asked and answered, ‘Just what problem is it that we are trying to solve?’”

Choose your favorite problem-solving scientist and somewhere in his or her writing you will find a quote something like, “a problem defined is a problem solved”. Dewey might have been the first -- I often quote Boss Kettering.

Now, I may get as angry with Rick Wagoner as much as the next guy for the many mistakes GM has made over the years as well as for failure to develop more effective long-term strategy and execution. But, is “he” (of course I don’t mean Mr. Wagoner really, we’ll just use him as the symbol for all that has gone wrong with Detroit management) the problem? Recognize that from a short-term perspective, the Detroit 3 do have -- agree with it or not -- an argument. That argument is that they need short-term cash -- cash that they can’t get through conventional means due to frozen financial markets -- because without it: (1) they can’t run their day-to-day business operations and (2 ) customers can’t buy cars. Those things combined with the precipitous fall in vehicle sales volumes was far more than their cash reserves could bear. Note that not only the Detroit 3 but every mainstream auto manufacturer is in dire straights. Toyota will be okay, proving its resilience as it has during every previous economic crisis: economic downturns, you know, are always our opportunity to distinguish real lean wheat from fake lean chaff. Globally, many of the auto companies may go under, each of them asking their respective governments for a “bailout” as they go down. It would be interesting if the U.S. turns be the only government that won’t offer major assistance.

That’s the Detroit 3 argument anyway. You decide for yourself whether or not you want to loan them money -- just weigh the risks. It’s just a business proposition -- do you think the value gained is worth the risk that you won’t get paid back? Once you decide, write your congressman. But, let’s at least recognize their argument.

But, good luck hearing that argument amidst the cacophony. Rather, the sight of the Detroit 3 CEOs, especially GM’s, sitting before them hat in hand (and with TV cameras) was just too good of a target for the lawmakers to pass up. Dogs to a bone (notice, by the way, how the most vociferous critics happen to be from states that have direct foreign auto investment?).

So, what problem is it they’re trying to solve?

The longer-term failure of the Detroit 3 to adapt to changing circumstances (high costs, poor products, wrong products, environmental indifference)?
If that’s the problem, the solution(s) will also be longer term (a $25 billion loan won’t go very far, won’t solve the underlying problems).

Excesses of Detroit 3 executives (corporate jets) and UAW members (job banks, restrictive practices, etc.)?
If that’s the problem, there must be a lot of companies in the same boat (yacht?).

The fact that credit is so tight the Detroit 3 can’t run their day-to-day business and consumers can’t buy cars?
If that’s the problem, wasn’t freeing up capital markets the purpose of the $700 billion Wall Street bailout??

The likelihood that -- whatever your personal view of the causes of the situation -- a $25 billion loan will be “cheaper” than the cost of Detroit 3 total failure, both short term (thousands of failed businesses, millions of unemployed workers, lost taxes for communities…) and long term (no national auto industry -- the industry that has proved in most countries to be the most powerful engine for economic growth)?
If that’s the problem, you can make a strong argument for bridge loans.

The fact that the Detroit 3 haven’t fully transformed themselves and adopted a new (lean) business model?
If that’s the problem, we need to ask why (maybe more than five times) that hasn’t happened.

Of course, the above “problems” interrelate. And they each have multiple causes. But, the cat-and-mouse sparring and scoring of points for viewers back home by politicians just adds confusion on top of bewilderment. Does anyone truly understand what happened on Wall Street? The answer to that question appears to be no, or certainly no one in Washington, but that didn’t stop them from throwing solutions at it. True, toss enough spaghetti and something may stick. But, if we’ve ever needed lean thinking, it’s now. Or if the Lean Community ever had an opportune time to share with others the power of lean thinking, that time is also now. Which relates to…

Last week’s column…

…received a lot of response, some of which you can see here, some of which came from other sources.

That column was written in response to a specific question that I often hear -- “Why hasn’t GM learned from Toyota?” That’s not exactly the same question as “Why is GM failing?” They are related questions, or questions with overlapping answers, but they are very different. I certainly was not intending for those 1,500 words to be the final word on what went wrong at GM.

The reasons for GM being in its current boat are many, complex, and intertwined. There are some good articles in journals right now (Fortune’s cover story by Alex Taylor for one) and no doubt MANY more on the way over the coming months. After all, everybody has their take on the car industry -- we all drive one, and most of us either love them or hate them. My own love affair with cars goes back to auto mechanic school in the 1960s (not really much else to do growing up in the small-town south). In addition to all the recent articles, books have been written about GM’s deep problems going back many years now. One of my early favorites was Brock Yates’ The Decline and Fall of the American Auto Industry. Many if not most if not all of Yates’ observations still hold true today and he wrote that book in, let’s see now, that would have been the same year I joined Toyota …1983!!

Ouch.

So, a lot of people in Detroit, including many smart folks inside GM, have known the company had serious -- life-threatening serious -- problems for a very long time. All this railing from Washington and elsewhere about Detroit managers simply being stupid misses the point and distracts from the deeper questions. If smart people saw what was going on, took action to try to change course (for example NUMMI, where I played a small role, and Saturn and many other attempts) yet couldn’t, what does that say about transformation of large organizations?

Before you answer, note this: that failure to transform isn’t just because no one in Detroit read John Kotter’s eight steps to successful change or Peter Senge’s description of the learning organization. Or whoever your favorite is.

So what…

…I won’t claim to know all the answers, or even all the questions. And we will continue to explore both of those in this space. But, while I don’t know the questions or answers today, one thing I DO know is that both will emerge ONLY from further effort to clarify the problem(s) and understand the reasons behind them -- the “why?”

See you next week.

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

Survive to Make Money or Make Money to Survive?


December 4, 2008
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With GM’s demise becoming more real every day, many people have been asking me, “Why didn’t GM learn from Toyota when they had the perfect chance?” After all, NUMMI was an open door for GM, since Toyota provided GM full access to pretty much everything it does. GM has had the single best access, by far, of any competitor to learn from Toyota. I happened to be there at NUMMI in the beginning.

So, let’s go back, briefly, to that opportunity for GM to adopt the best lean practices. The first GM managers, a group of 10 mid-level executives led by Ed Muirhead, visited Toyota City to begin their learning process in February 1984. They were followed quickly by three GM production managers assigned to actually manage different production areas at NUMMI, Larry Spiegle in Stamping, Ken Souza in Paint, and Doug Katko in Quality Control (other areas were run by a combination of Toyota and direct NUMMI hires). From there dozens, hundreds, eventually thousands of GM folks from all levels and disciplines came to NUMMI, saw what they could see, and went back home.

GM had a lot to gain from NUMMI: a good small car (the Chevy Nova-badged Corolla), the chance to put an idle plant and workforce back to work, and an up-close gemba opportunity to learn TPS. Part of my very job was to help teach TPS to GM people. And so it went -- Toyota running NUMMI operations, GM selling Novas while dispatching people to NUMMI to learn.

I left Toyota in 1994. At that time, at least, GM still didn’t know how to make a small car profitably and still didn’t understand TPS. And here we are today. So the question remains: why not?

Some people say that Toyota didn’t actually open the door all the way. That they hid the best stuff. I can tell you that’s not true.

Others (including many people inside GM) say that the individuals who went to NUMMI to learn simply didn’t learn. They were looking at the wrong things. They just “didn’t get it”. This is the most common view – they just didn’t get it.

Secrets of Successful Change
But, I have a different view. I think many of the GM people who spent time learning at NUMMI did in fact learn a lot -- they got it, all right. But, “getting it” and knowing what to do with it back at GM to turn that monster around was a vastly different story. So, why didn’t GM learn? Or why didn’t they change based on what they learned about lean from NUMMI? I have a three-part answer.

First, actually, GM has learned. Or learned a lot, anyway. Sure, maybe GM is still no Toyota, but who is (is your company)? GM has done more to learn and to change themselves than most people will ever recognize.

But, it took them a very long time to change as much as they have. Perhaps that goes with the territory of being the world’s largest and most successful company for over half a century.

That’s actually the second part of my answer: the fact is that it takes far longer than we like to think to effect major change in organizations that are so large, with such entrenched cultures and patterns of operating and behaving. It may very well be that there is more for us to learn from GM than from Toyota -- what went right but also what went wrong, what doesn’t work. And why.

The third part of my answer is that while I argue that GM people have learned and changed a lot, it’s unclear how deeply the company has really learned, or changed as a company. Many of the tools and systems are in place. By all reports, GM’s newest plants are world class -- right up there with Toyota and the rest -- in both quality and productivity. However, the real secrets to Toyota’s success aren’t to be found in successful implementation of tools and techniques, systems or even “principles”. It really gets into basic thinking, the thinking each individual brings to each task, each team to each challenge, the organization to the achievement of its aims.

And what ARE those aims? Attainment of financial targets? That’s not the case with Toyota.

The Real Aim
“But,” you may say, “Toyota clearly wants to make money.” Yes, absolutely Toyota wants to make money as much as the next company, and they do it extremely well. However, the company’s real aim is something much deeper, and is the thing that has driven the company to be so successful for so long: the will to survive. Everything else -- tools, systems, even principles -- follows from that. A highly developed instinct for survival will take you a long, long way.

“But,” you may say, “the Detroit 3 also want to survive” -- that’s the whole reason they went to Washington. In fact, some argue that they’re trying to cling to life longer than they should, beyond their usefulness. I won’t even disagree with that point, but, there’s a difference.

Yes, GM wants to survive -- hence the humbling appearances on Capitol Hill by Wagoner and the two other Detroit CEOs. Yet had GM been seeking long-term survival a la Toyota, it would have made different decisions all along. GM wants to survive, all right, it wants to survive so it can continue to make money. Toyota on the other hand, wants to make money to survive.

Think about that: Toyota makes money to survive; the Detroit 3 exist (survive) to make money. Those contrasting senses of purpose will take you down very different paths.

If you aim for survival, your modus operandi becomes adaptability. How has Toyota pursued or demonstrated adaptability? When I first got a handle on how Toyota built flexibility into its operating (production) system design, I didn’t realize how unique it was, but could immediately recognize its elegance, whole-ness, and power.

The auto industry is inherently inflexible. Producing a car requires huge investment in massive infrastructure that takes years to put in place. It takes about four years to bring a new car to market (yes, Toyota and some others have reduced the actual product development time line to well under four years, but the basic rhythm of the industry and the standard full product cycle is still four years). That means four years in advance, you have to predict or put in the capability to provide what a customer will want four years later. That’s risky business.

Here are some ways Toyota builds in flexibility to mitigate that risk and maintain flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. Toyota will:
  • Design products through a set-based (as opposed to point-based) process that enables making better decisions later.
  • Install capacity in smaller increments and steadily increase that capacity as needed in smaller increments (just-in-time capacity).
  • Mix capacity together -- build multiple products in each factory, more than one product on each line (so they can mix and match capacity to meet changes in demand, enable each machine to changeover quickly and to easily produce a variety of parts.
  • Set the operating plan at two shifts per day with a gap in between shifts to enable day-to-day adaptability.
  • Build a certain level of overtime expectation in the initial operation plan for new capacity -- when (if) demand falls, it is then easy to just cut out the overtime.
  • If demand falls more, you can reduce the takt time. And then increase it again and you can do that from month to month.
  • Set (at the Toyota plant in Japan when I was there) the plan for production volumes (takt time) in the assembly plants (which control the rhythm of the entire value chain) only a week before the start of the month, revising those volumes every ten days throughout the month, yet set the actual production sequence only hours before the start of each production day.
  • Order parts replenishment at the last possible moment at the point of use when the worker actually needs them (kanban).
  • Hire employees carefully, thinking not only about how many you need to meet current demand but how many experienced employees you will need years down the road.
  • Use “temporary employees” to judiciously mediate uncertainty with short and long term employment needs.
  • Develop those employees to work flexibly, with multiple skills and ability to do various jobs; transfer workers as needs change.
  • Develop those workers to redesign their own work (standardized work with kaizen) to meet changing conditions -- 2,000 workers equal the job redesign capability of 2,000 industrial engineers.

Different Purpose
There is more, but you get the point. Note that every single one of the above methods is “inefficient” on the surface. Note also that conventional management thinking leads to the exact opposite conclusion on each and every one of them. That’s because they are manifestations of a business model that embodies the effective shift from command and control (tell people what to do, removed from the gemba, and seek compliance) to the directed engagement of each individual pursuing answers to questions that they own.

Taken together, that all represents the difference in developing the organizational capabilities that enable dynamic adaptation to changes in the environment. And that all stems from a different sense of purpose -- the difference between surviving to make money and making money to survive.

So, if we borrow LEI’s “Purpose, Process and People” framework for understanding organizations, you could say that GM learned -- contrary to popular opinion -- quite a lot from Toyota about process, never really got very far at all into the people part (maybe a topic for another day) and, most importantly, all along its very purpose was utterly different. And, it just may be that purpose isn’t really something you “learn”.

See you next week.

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

Eiji Toyoda and Management Muda


November 20, 2008
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Eiji Toyoda is well-known to Toyota enthusiasts but almost unheard of among general management commentators and observers. He did make it into the Automotive Hall of Fame in 1994 (following Shoichiro Honda, the second of only six Japanese individuals among 136 industry leaders to be so honored) but has probably never even been mentioned in an analysis that is not specifically about Toyota, the company.

Enthusiasts know how tremendously influential Eiji has been to the development of Toyota and its revolutionary management system. Perhaps his story will never be fully told, but Eiji, a former president and chairman of Toyota, could be the most important figure in all the rich history of the company’s evolution.

During my tenure with Toyota in Japan from 1983 to 1991, Eiji’s presence was felt in the company everywhere, all the time. The first time I met him, on a dowdy cruise ship in August 1984 during an annual employee event called the “Toyota Cruising Seminar” (a story in itself, for another day), Eiji was as he was every time I had the good fortune to meet him: straightforward, totally unpretentious, and intently focused on the practical matters at hand. Each year, for the purpose of team-building, a different top executive (from the six individuals who ran the company -- the chairman, president, and four executive vice presidents) -- would join the five-day cruise along with several hundred young employees. This year as probably every year, the young employees were reverential but eager while Eiji was somber yet engaged, approaching this opportunity to spend casual time with the company’s younger generations with the same seriousness and sense of gravity that he approached stewardship of the business, an attitude that was reflected in every corner of the company.

Toyota approached the welfare of all constituents -- the livelihood of its employees, the desires of its customers, the welfare of subsidiaries and partner companies and even competitors -- with full awareness of the responsibility that executive decision-making entails. That awareness was reflected in everything, from hiring decisions, to expansion strategy, and even to small matters concerning the construction of a new physical facility. Little is left to casual consideration when every investment is thought of as a long-term obligation: “I’m hiring this person today -- do I think I will need him in 20 years? We’re constructing a new building in one of our communities -- are we committed to invest in the business locally to justify all that that entails?” Eiji wanted to tour every Toyota facility, even as global operations became more and more far-flung. Each new undertaking wasn’t just a matter of the dollars and yen of an ROI calculation. It was the beginning of a commitment.

Of course Eiji knew that no business can predict the future. Anything can happen. But, I’m sure he also recognized that what a business can and should do is to commit to uphold commitment to meet obligations, to do everything within its power to live up to the responsibilities it takes on. Eiji described himself as forward-looking, never thinking much about the past. He recognized that the future is unpredictable, and he was determined to face it with a spirit of “Let’s turn our attention there and do what we can do, then tackle each challenge as it appears.” Even after he retired, the respect afforded Eiji among Toyota executives was palpable and frequently expressed: “What would Eiji think, do, say?” So, surely he is a good authority on the evasive topic of “leadership.”

The month following my first encounter with him, Eiji began telling his story in a series of articles in Japan’s top business newspaper, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, which sent me to my Japanese-English dictionary so I could read them at my desk in Toyota City. One year later, those articles were compiled and published in a book called Ketsudan (Decision). They were published two years after that in an English translation with the title Fifty Years in Motion -- an Autobiography by the Chairman. Unfortunately, parts of the original articles were edited out of the Japanese book and parts of the Japanese book were further edited out in the English book. So, here is my own translation of my favorite Eiji quote:

“The people at the top are just flag-wavers. It is muda to wave your flag and have no one follow. What’s important is to wave your flag in a way that makes people want to follow.”

Taiichi Ohno’s seven wastes of production are well known -- Eiji has just given us the first waste of management: the “waste of meaningless flag-waving”!

Eiji Toyoda turned 95 years old on September 12th. Let’s hope his story is eventually told more fully and his contributions to business management afforded the recognition they deserve.

See you next week.

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

The Most Frustrated Person in Your Company


November 14, 2008
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No, it’s not you. Earlier in my career I spent most of my time down in the front lines of organizations. As time passed, I associated more and more with higher and higher organizational levels. Nowadays, I spend a lot of time with COOs and CEOs.

That transition has been interesting in many ways, as you may know from your own experience. One interesting insight has been to find that, as you move up and down the organizational ladder, worries change while they stay the same.

For those who work in organizations, it becomes second nature to look up -- look up for praise, look up for solutions, for orders, for direction. Now, some among us tend to look down -- to take care of their own people or perhaps to be “liked” by them. Others look sideways, maybe seeking recognition from peers. Of course, none of us does any of those things ALL the time. But, organizational climbers tend to usually look up.

And so the person at the top is often someone who has -- no surprise here -- spent a lot of his time looking up. Then, after a career of climbing and finally making his way to the top, he looks up and … there’s no one there! (Actually, of course, that’s not really true -- there is a board of directors and a portfolio of customers, but the theory of the system states that the CEO is now in the driver’s seat -- he or she is “accountable”.) So what does all this mean to us as we try to radically transform our organizations?

To explore that, let’s go back to the front lines. I couldn’t count the number of times I have heard from front-line managers: “I know what to do to lead my organization, but I have all these constraints … if I were plant manager, I could get this done.”

So, I go talk to the plant manager. And guess what. The plant manager says the same thing: “I could get this done if I were VP of operations”.

I go talk to the Ops VP. She says the same thing. “If I were the COO …”

And so it continues. All the way to the CEO’s office. And, to my surprise and perhaps to yours, there is no one in the organization who is more frustrated than the CEO. Your CEO. Why? Because he can’t get done anything that he wants to get done! He can issue edicts, only to find corporate inertia smother every initiative. He can reengineer incentives, only to find the law of unintended consequences hijacks his good intentions. He can develop brilliant strategy, only to find lack of capability in the organization render the strategy stalled at the start line.

What does that mean to all of us, we non-CEOs? It is true that wherever we sit in an organization, we have to look elsewhere for many things -- we can’t develop broad corporate strategy on our own; we have challenges that naturally cascade from above or are outside of our control. But, if you decide to wait until you are bestowed with all the authority you think you will need to bring about the change that you want, you will be waiting forever.

That’s the great thing about lean management as I view it -- it’s based on individuals taking initiative to improve the things within their control, however broad or narrow that may be. Individuals in a lean management system take initiative to gain authorization to implement their ideas, manufacturing the authority they need when they need it: on-demand, just-in-time, “pull-based authority.” You will find no more appropriate occasion to exercise initiative, no better place to start than … right here and right now. This is as opportune as it gets.

See you next week.

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

"Our people are our most important asset"…Really?


November 6, 2008
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In the spring of 1984, I was helping Toyota develop a training program to support the first full-scale implementation of its production system outside of Toyota City. As the only American member of the company’s Education & Training Department, one of my challenges was to help create training materials in English to explain myriad aspects -- technical and social -- of Toyota’s system. One aspect of the company that demanded thorough explanation was its human resource management philosophy and system. Based on what I knew of Toyota HRM at the time, I offered up what is now a familiar line to explain it: “Our people are our most important asset”. It was one sentence -- a kind of a slogan -- of a small pamphlet and it sounded good to me.

So I was surprised when the general manager of our department called me over to challenge it. My first presumption was that he just didn’t understand the English words. But, as I explained -- perfectly satisfactorily I thought -- he kept pushing back. For awhile, I persisted, still assuming that he just didn’t understand the English in a bit of an impasse.

As he continued to question me, uncovering some of the hidden assumptions buried in my slogan, I slowly began to grasp what he was trying to get me to see. “Who is the ‘we’ in ‘our people’? Who is the ‘us’ in ‘our asset’?” he asked. “Why, the company, of course,” I responded with some frustration at the fact that he couldn’t see the obvious goodness in the sentence I had written. Yet, gradually, it began to dawn on me that the cause of our impasse might be less a matter of his failure to understand English and more the fault of my immature understanding of the philosophy. He was getting at something deeper than I had first recognized. And that was the real reason I was having such a difficult time communicating in simple English the profound concept he was coaching me to share.

“Does it make any sense to say, “Our people are our most important resource” when we are the people and the company is us?” he pressed. Upon reflection, I realized the deeper truth in what he was getting at. He was right -- it doesn’t make sense to say that people are our most important asset. This well-intentioned phrase was in fact carrying a buried and profoundly disrespectful message, implying conventional capital asset thinking, treating the people in the organization as an asset to be computed along with any other number in a ROI calculation. It missed the point. Badly.

I realize now that his concern wasn’t that I get the phrasing exactly right. He was challenging me on a basic level so that I could understand that people aren’t just an asset (leading me to chafe at the currently popular term, “human capital”) -- we are the people and the people are the company.

I still don’t know how to state in a succinct and precisely nuanced way the profound concept that he so desperately wanted me to understand. Looking back now with chagrin at this exchange that occurred 25 years ago, I am humbled to tell you that the end to this saga was that I decided to dig in my heels, declare, “This is the way we would communicate that philosophy in English,” and with that I “won” the argument. The materials went out with my wrongly nuanced explanation. To this day, I sometimes see Toyota materials with that statement on it.

I met that general manager at a reunion dinner just a couple of years ago. He didn’t even remember the discussion but I apologized anyway.

See you next week.

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

The A3 Process -- Discovery at Toyota and What it Can Do for You


October 30, 2008
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You may know that I just completed the book, Managing to Learn: Using the A3 Management Process to Solve Problems, Gain Agreement, Manage, Mentor, and Lead. This corner is to some degree the result of the heap of leftover ideas sitting on my desk after finishing it. I won’t try to summarize the book here (you can find a summary and excerpts at lean.org), but you may find the background of its creation interesting.

LEI had wanted to publish a book about the A3 for several years before we finally created Managing to Learn. My dilemma during this time was that while I was honored to be asked and could see the value of the A3 as a process, I also saw a major problem with a book about it. The challenge isn’t in teaching how to write an A3 but in how to use the A3 as a managerial process. If the A3 was presented as a narrow tool, the deeper and broader aspects of the overall process would be lost. I really didn’t want to just introduce yet another narrow tool. It has long been my view that using tools for tool’s sake (where everything is a hammer looking for a nail) is one of the very biggest problems in “LeanWorld.”

So, working with the LEI editorial team, we quickly explored the idea of telling the story of how an individual prepared and used an A3 proposal. But even well-executed, that alone wouldn’t necessarily resolve my problem. I needed to tell the story from “both” sides, since it takes two (as least) to fully exercise the A3 process. Initially I suggested actually writing two books, with each one telling the same story (of the same improvement) from the two perspectives of a mentor and mentee. Now, LEI is open-minded, willing to experiment, and occasionally even adventurous, but that idea was deemed a little too radical, or maybe just stupid. After some discussion and even rapid prototyping (!) we landed on the equally radical but more practical (and smarter) idea of telling the story through two perspectives in running parallel columns. Tell me if you have, but I’ve never seen a book structured quite like it.

From the first draft, some readers expressed difficulties with this dual format. Readers have a choice in how to read the book -- read the left column first, then go back and read the right? Read them both more or less at the same time? It reminds me of real-life conversations at the gemba in which two people are talking to you at the same time: “Listen to me first!” “No, listen to me!” I became convinced that the two-column, side-by-side structure of the book was the most effective way to dynamically show the dual or multifaceted way of thinking embodied by the A3 process. It must generate learning for both the mentor and mentee. It must simultaneously address a problem while exposing new ones. My own experience many years ago revealed to me the many dynamics of using A3 thinking.

I discovered the importance of the A3 process firsthand, as do all Toyota employees. In my case, my first managers, Isao Yoshino and Ken Kunieda, and co-workers desperately needed me to learn the thinking and gain the skills so I could begin to make myself useful! But, the process I went through was in no way special. When I joined Toyota in Toyota City (where for a time I was the only American) in late 1983, every newly hired college graduate employee began learning his job by being coached through the A3 creation process. The new employee would arrive at his new desk to find waiting for him a problem, a mentor, and a process to learn for solving that problem. The entire process was structured around PDCA and captured in the A3.

The problem awaiting the newcomer had been determined by his manager and scoped out by the mentor the manager assigned. The new employee would begin solving the problem by first understanding the situation. He would define the problem, analyze it, investigate its causes, brainstorm potential countermeasures, evaluate those solutions, and then propose -- i.e. “sell” his recommended countermeasure, which would often involve a simple trial or small experiment. The selling, however, is an inclusive process in which the owner continually improves the content and accuracy of the A3 report as a result of obtaining greater input, and as a result, agreement and support from others.

As an example, my work team used the A3 process to solve a simple office problem. The story is common to anyone who has worked in an office and encountered the question, “Where’s the damned file?” The tools the team used were unremarkable. What was remarkable was the effort and discipline the team put into such a mundane problem. Our team did get some benefit from an improved ability to find the right information at the right time, the essential office problem. But, more importantly and fundamentally, our team was training itself. By learning to apply the problem solving tools in this situation, all the team members learned how to apply them in other situations and they deepened their own thinking skills which they can apply to every issue they encounter, every day. Practiced students of TQM would quickly recognize the example as a very typical QC Circle project report. What is significant is the way Toyota has systematized A3 thinking throughout the organization as a core discipline of management.

“Where’s the damned file?” was a simple problem, but the value of the process extended far beyond its face value of enabling us to find files faster. Education and learning were embedded in the process of working on the A3 (the improvement project) itself. It exemplified learning through doing at its best. The more A3s I wrote, the better I became at the thought process. Internalizing the thinking is the objective, not technical mastery of the format. The more cycles of reflection and learning that can be experienced, the better it is for the individual and for the organization.

The most fundamental use of the A3 is as a simple problem-solving tool. But the underlying principles and practices can be applied in any organizational settings. Given that the first use of the A3 as a tool is to standardize a methodology to understand and respond to problems, A3s encourage root cause analysis, reveal processes, and represent goals and action plans in a format that triggers conversation and learning. A good A3 has sound problem-solving -- science -- embedded inside, but it achieves much more, exemplifying this great quote by a great scientist:

“Science is built of facts the way a house is built of bricks, but an accumulation of facts is no more science than a pile of bricks is a house.” - Henri Poincaré

In exactly the same way, a good A3 is more than a collection of data that solves a problem -- it tells a story that can coalesce an organization.

See you next week.

John Shook

Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

No Excuses


October 22, 2008
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There has been much drive-by observation of lean operations over the years. A drive-by will unveil a fair amount of the operational side of lean, much less of the managerial. But, one management characteristic the observant drive-by observer will in fact be able to see quickly is no blame -- the contrast of the five whys of lean management with the five whos of traditional management will even jump out at you.

No blame is indeed an important feature of lean management. A culture of management seeking where to place the blame -- the five whos -- will absolutely prevent the flourishing of a culture that fosters ubiquitous use of the five whys. And there is little more essential to lean management than investigation of the root causes of problems at the gemba through the persistent use of the five whys.

You have to stick around a little longer, observe a little closer to see the rarely-discussed flip side to no blame: no excuses. Without this behavior -- adopting the attitude and practice of no excuses -- the essential five why practice cannot take root nor can a solid lean management system develop. No excuses is a necessary enabler of no blame. A reason lean managers don’t focus on who to blame for a given problem is simply (pause) that they don’t have to -- because ownership of the issue is already clear.

For example, a worker on an assembly line owns accurate, complete, and timely execution of his or her standardized work. Improper torque applied to a bolt? Why? Was correct torque defined, the proper tool supplied, and clear job instructions and training provided? Then, the worker has no excuses. The team leader owns the support, training, and leadership of his or her team members as well as the completion with 100% quality of his team’s clearly defined output. No excuses. Plant floor responsibilities such as those are relatively easy, actually. But, in a lean management system, the same principle applies … everywhere. For every problem that occurs, ownership is or must be made clear -- no excuses. An engineering drawing is incomplete -- no excuses. An invoice is incorrect -- no excuses. An SEC filing is improper (are you listening Wall Street?) -- no excuses.

Canadian hockey coach and commentator Barry Melrose describes the role of the coach in any sport: “The coach’s job is to take excuses away from the player -- no travel problems, no equipment problems, no bad practices, no bad game plans -- so that there is nowhere for the player to look but in the mirror.”

I think the same truism applies to work as well. Think back to our assembly line worker above who may improperly perform his or her standardized work. Our challenge as manager/leaders is to understand why the worker isn’t following the standardized work, to ask why the worker can’t perform the job as designed, to ask what stands in the way between the worker and successful completion of his or her job requirements? Our job is to remove all those barriers, so there is nowhere else for the worker to look but in the mirror. The worker needs proper tools? Supply them. Needs training? Provide it. Needs the right part at the right time in the right amount? Get it there. Needs deeper understanding of the purpose? Explain it.

When no excuses is established, no blame is easy. When no excuses isn’t present, no blame is impossible.

See you next time,
John


John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

What is Lean Management?


October 15, 2008
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I sometimes wonder if we should bother making a distinction between management, and “lean management.” The late Peter Drucker is our foremost authority so far on “management,” and he tells us, “The essence of management is not techniques and procedures. The essence of management is to make knowledge productive.” Pretty good place to start, I’d say, and a definition that probably covers “lean management” as well as any management. But if lean thinking means a different approach to business, then it must also imply a different approach to managing by the people striving to operate in a “lean” way.

My own view of management comes from a little more than 10 years experience working with Toyota, combined with about 15 years of working with many of you to try to understand and use those principles and practices. I’m not sure which experience has taught me more -- learning directly from Toyota, or trying to help others learn what I learned at Toyota.

Either way, what we’ll discuss in this space represents neither Toyota’s view nor the views of the many companies and individuals I have worked with and from whom I have learned so much. Nor will it represent LEI’s view. As the disclaimer goes, “The views expressed in this space are solely those of the author, who bears all responsibility for mistakes, errors, lies, and misunderstandings.” I will not go so far as to accept responsibility for the consequences should any of you attempt to try any of the ideas we explore here at home or work. Sorry, but you’re on your own.

The Spirit of Lean Management
I don’t actually have a firm plan for this space. So, I figured, why not use that condition as a starting point? Keeping an open mind about what this space could become may not seem to embody the “planful” aspect of lean management. And yet this approach is consistent with the critical lean management principle of not jumping to solutions. Lean management is not about quick answers, but about going through a thinking process to investigate, analyze, and understand. To try, perhaps to fail, and learn.

In short, lean management is very much about asking questions and trying things, or encouraging others to try things. Lean management itself is not much about providing the right answer but it is very much about asking the right question.

So, what we’ll do in this space is just explore. What to expect -- exploring questions. What not to expect -- answers. Here’s a great quote that captures the spirit of what I’ll aim for:

“The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the right questions” - Claude Levi-Strauss.

That statement captures the core spirit of lean management just as it also embodies the spirit of learning. And unfortunately, traditional management all too often lacks that very spirit. Traditional management places tremendous pressure on individuals to be right. You must have a Solution, must know The Answer. That sounds good enough on the surface. Who wants to be “wrong”? But that attitude starts us down a familiar and dangerous path. Hiding problems is endemic in almost every company I know and is the surest way to absolutely undermine the practice of effective lean management. Exposing problems, developing countermeasures, and learning from them doesn’t just support lean management; it is lean management.

Robert McNamara, the Secretary of State for U.S. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has been picked on mercilessly in recent years, and I’ll join in the piling on here. During a review of the mid-1960s U.S. military effort in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, an Army officer attempted to inform McNamara that there were many problems that he needed to be aware of. To which the Secretary replied, “I don’t want to hear about your problems, I want to hear about your progress.” Contrast that with a couple of his contemporaries, the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss quoted above, and Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz:

“You can tell whether a man is clever by his answers. You can tell whether a man is wise by his questions.” I’d say the latter expresses a pretty good lean management aspiration.

See you next time,
John

John Shook
Senior Advisor, Lean Enterprise Institute

I view this column as a trial. We’ll start out with a short, weekly discussion from me that focuses on some aspect of “management”, or “lean management”. You are then invited to send in your comments to shook@lean.org. In the following week’s column, I may or may not respond directly to your comments (assuming any) and either carry the topic further or introduce a new one. We will review how things are going in a couple of months. We may decide to continue going as-is (P-D-C-A/Standardize), or continue with adjustments (P-D-C-Adjust), or abandon (P-D-C-Abandon). Stay tuned.